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Contradiction in Terms: 
Nation States, Individual Rights and Refugee Policy 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
 
 
In 1945 delegates from fifty‐one nations came together to draft the charter of the 
United Nations. Two years later another set of representatives came together to draft the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The first drafting process was meant to give 
nation states a forum to solve disputes and protect national sovereignty. The second was 
intended to articulate and protect individual rights. Though a mark of progress for individual 
rights, the force of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was nonetheless blunted by a 
preemptive concern for national sovereignty. This was, and is, a document setting out the 
universal rights of individuals, but written by representatives of nation states. It is a document 
proclaiming the sovereignty of individuals crafted within the context of a great deference for 
national sovereignty. The goal of shaping a universal plank to secure individual rights was 
doomed from the start –as the UN really had no power to enforce these rights and nations had 
little obligation to uphold them. This tension between the guarantee of individual rights and the 
primacy of the state was evident from the outset of the drafting of the declaration.  
The assertion of national sovereignty is also quite evident in the international conflict 
taking place simultaneously: the Arab‐Israeli War. The Arab‐Israeli War was the first 
international conflict and instance of human rights violation with which the UN was confronted 
as it attempted to lay out a standard of universal human rights. It was the first non‐theoretical 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event with which the UDHR was put in direct conversation. The drafters made it clear that they 
were aware the refugee fallout from the war was precisely the type of situation the declaration 
was meant to address, and the emerging declaration provided a framework through which the 
war was approached. Ultimately, these two events, the drafting of the UDHR and the Arab‐
Israeli War, examined in tandem illuminate the impasse and conflict between the rights of 
nation states and those of individuals, particularly when we look at the status of refugees.  
  Nevertheless, the UDHR is regarded by many as a landmark of progress within the realm 
of human rights, as one of the first international instruments to recognize the universality of 
certain individual rights. However, the contradiction inherent to the document is largely 
overlooked. The concept of a group of nation states ensuring universal rights to individuals –
rights which it is often not in their best interest to ensure, and which they have no real impetus 
to compel them to abide by –is inherently contradictory.  
Only one month after the end of World War Two, delegates met in San Francisco to 
draft the charter that would establish the United Nations.1 The UN was founded as a 
replacement of sorts for the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations. The League of Nations 
had been deemed a failure due to its inability to prevent the war.  After the Second World War, 
the world community made a second attempt at forming an international administrative body. 
The United Nations was, in many ways, very similar to the League. Mark Mazower, scholar of 
European history, calls the United Nations “a warmed‐up League” because the League and the 
UN bore a very close resemblance to one another. However, the United Nations differed from 
the League in some significant ways, perhaps most significantly so in that veto power was given 
                                                           
1 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 78. The war in Europe ended May 8th and the UN Charter was signed June 26th 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to the Big Three (the name given to the US, USSR and UK). This specific change made “the great 
powers . . . simultaneously both more willing to support the UN –since it could not act against 
them—and more willing to ignore it (for the same reason).”2 
In No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United 
Nations, Mazower writes a critical review of the origin of the United Nations. He takes a hard 
look at the motives behind its founding, and gives a realistic evaluation of the efficacy of the 
organization. Specific to its human rights policy, he writes that even though the League of 
Nations gets a harsh assessment, it really had better human rights protections than the UN: 
“minorities would find less protection under the United Nations than they had done under the 
League . . . The United Nations became an even fiercer defender of national sovereignty than 
the League had been.”3 Despite its aims at providing more protection for individuals, the United 
Nations ultimately achieved less, in this regard, than its predecessor had. Particular to refugee 
rights, the UN put in place a bill of rights that deferred to national power. However, Emma 
Haddad, Research Associate at the University of Oxford Refugee Study Centre, compares the 
League of Nations and the UN in a different way, saying that the League of Nations had a 
positive view of sovereignty that “saw a state’s internal sovereignty as the guarantee of the 
protection of individuals qua citizens, the negative view of sovereignty upheld by the United 
Nations saw a state’s external sovereignty as the guarantee of the protection of the individuals 
qua individuals.”4 Where the League of Nations saw the means of protection for individuals to 
                                                           
2 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 16.  
3 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 24 and 25. 
4 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 137. 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reside in their status as citizens of nation states, the UN attempted to make individual rights a 
universal guarantee, regardless of citizenship. The UDHR was a key part of this change. Adopted 
in 1948, the UDHR was one of the first international instruments to recognize the universal 
nature of individual rights.  
  Within the literature on human rights, refugees, and international policy, there is a 
general recognition of this dilemma between sovereignty and rights, but few make a specific or 
detailed analysis of the inconsistency within the UDHR itself. At the initial adoption ceremony 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt said, “We stand today at the 
threshold of a great event both in the life of the United Nations and in the life of mankind. This 
declaration may well become the international Magna Carta of all men everywhere.” The UDHR 
has since been referred to as the changing point in the human rights movement, the 
preemptory norm for international policy. Scholars on the subject agree that, although the 
Declaration was adopted without an enforcement mechanism, it has revolutionized the 
international human rights regime. In “The Declaration of Human Rights in Postmodernity,” 
diplomat and prominent human rights actor, Jose Alves examines the Declaration in relation to 
postmodernity. Alves, like many scholars, writes of the Declaration’s pivotal role in the human 
rights movement:  
For more than half a century, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
proclaimed by the United Nations in 1948, has played an extraordinary role in 
the history of mankind. It codified the hopes of the oppressed, supplying 
authoritative language to the semantics of their claims . . . It launched a new and 
profuse juridical discipline, the International Law of Human Rights . . . It set 
parameters for evaluating the legitimacy of any government, replacing the 
efficacy of force by the force of ethics.5 
                                                           
5 Jose Lindgren Alves, “The Declaration of Human Rights in Postmodernity,” Human Rights Quarterly 22.2 (2000), 
478. 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Alves acknowledges the Declaration’s flaws, but is intrigued by what he sees as the impact it 
has had in spite of this. Other scholars agree with Alves about the UDHR’s monumental impact 
on human rights law and practice. Johannes Morsink writes, “In the late 1940s believers in 
human rights had to fight for intellectual legitimacy, a battle they finally won on account of the 
horrors perpetrated by the Nazis. Now, as the document passes its fiftieth anniversary, critics 
have to make their case against the background of the extraordinary success that the 
Declaration has become.”6 Morsink references a long list of international human rights 
instruments and court cases, all of which reference or were inspired by the UDHR, as proof of 
its success.7 Like Morsink, James Nickel writes in Making Sense of Human Rights of the UDHRs 
role in influencing human rights history and policy: “The Universal Declaration has been 
amazingly successful in establishing a fixed worldwide meaning for the idea of human rights.”8 
He, too, cites a number of international instruments inspired by the UDHR.   
Specific to refugee rights and the UDHR, Haddad explores the roles of refugees in 
international law. She writes in The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns that 
“with the new emphasis on individual rights, as immortalized in the 1948 Universal declaration 
of Human Rights, refugees were recognized as individuals with a right to protection in a state.”9 
She does not go on to mention that this recognition has largely been in name only. It is often 
not pointed out that the progress marked by the UDHR was primarily abstract. W.M. Reisman 
                                                           
6 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), xi. 
7 Treaties and conventions inspired by the UDHR include: the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966), The American Convention on Human Rights (1966), and as many as forty others. 
8 James Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 9. 
9 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 137. 
6 
 
writes about sovereignty in relation to international human rights in his article “Sovereignty and 
Human Rights in Contemporary International Law.” He focuses his discussion more specifically 
on state versus popular sovereignty in terms of general elections, but he credits the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights with “dethroning” the sovereign. He also claims that “no serious 
scholar still supports the contention that internal human rights are ‘essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the state’ and hence insulated from international law.” 10 While 
Reisman is technically correct in his assertion (because the human rights reform after the 
Second World War changed the assumption that states are solely in control of their internal 
affairs) the idea is nonetheless only theoretically upheld, especially when it comes to refugees. 
In practice –for example during the Arab‐Israeli War—refugees were no more guaranteed 
protection after 1948 than they had been before the Declaration was drafted and endorsed.  
   The adoption of the UDHR in 1948 spurred the creation and adoption of a number of 
subsequent treaties and conventions. However, continuing refugee crises like the Palestinian 
refugees from the 1948 Arab‐Israeli War demonstrate the problematic nature of upholding the 
principles enshrined in the UDHR and the following conventions, from the very outset of its 
creation. In December 2008, the General Assembly of the UN celebrated the 60th anniversary of 
the UDHR, where they recognized the impact of the UDHR but also the continuing need for 
better practical enforcement of it. Martin Uhomoibhi, president of the UN Human Rights 
Council, spoke at the 60th anniversary of the Declaration: “Simply put, humanity today no 
longer lacks the human rights instruments to promote, protect and defend human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. However, what is sorely needed is for States party to existing human 
                                                           
10 W. M. Reisman, “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,” American Journal of 
International Law, 84  No. 4 (1990), 868 and 869. 
7 
 
rights instruments to take the practical steps necessary to implement their provisions for the 
benefit of all mankind.”11 Thus, over 60 years later the UDHR remains as theoretical as the day 
it was drafted. The UN has no more power to enforce its principles, and nation states just as 
little reason to live up to them. In his discussion of human rights history and practice, Charles 
Beitz writes that “international human rights practice notoriously lacks a standing capacity to 
enforce many of the rights listed in the major treaties, and even when an enforcement capacity 
exists, it usually applies selectively and often only at the sufferance of those states against 
which it might be used.”12  
I agree that the UDHR is not practically effective; it is of great theoretical significance 
without any substantial application. This lack of effectiveness is chiefly due to the root conflict 
of sovereignty between states and individuals. I examine this conflict through a close reading of 
the refugee articles within the UDHR, and through a careful examination of the UN debates 
surrounding the declaration. Though the UDHR is important for the ideological change it 
effected, its downfall has been that the great ideas promoted within it lack a practical means of 
enforcement or states willing to rigorously apply them.  Beitz writes that “one reason why 
governments found it possible to accept the principle of international concern for human rights 
was the expectation that the UN would respect the domestic jurisdiction of states by refraining 
from intervention in their internal affairs.”13 The UDHR was adopted because its drafters were 
comforted by the knowledge that they would not be forced to abide by it. The UDHR was a 
major development in the recognition of universal rights, but what made nation states willing 
                                                           
11 U.N. General Assembly, 63rd Session. 65th Meeting, Meeting Record. 10 Dec. 2008 (A/63/PV.65). 
12 Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2009), 3. 
13 Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2009), 21. 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to sign it in the past has made its enforcement problematic in the present.  I argue that the 
UDHR is both consequential and inadequate. Though an important step forward in the 
recognition of human rights, the supremacy of national sovereignty crippled its efficacy. The 
declaration debates were fraught with this tension between national power and individual 
rights, and the final articulation of rights within the UDHR displays this conflict. Lastly, the 1948 
Palestinian refugee crisis shows this contradiction in practice.  
  The initial refugee problem with which the United Nations wrestled after the Second 
World War, when drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, actually had its origins in 
the First World War and the shift in international refugee policy in the 1920s and 1930s. To fully 
understand the policy changes that came in the post‐war era, it is necessary to outline 
international refugee policy during the First and Second World Wars.  
During and after the First World War, immigration policy changed throughout the world.  
Specifically, nations began passing strict immigration quotas to limit the number of immigrants 
allowed into their countries each year. In her book, Refugees in Inter‐war Europe, Claudena 
Skran writes that the abrupt end of the period of free immigration began in the United States.14  
The U.S. set its first immigration quota in 1921, which established limits on the number of 
immigrants allowed each year and attempted to “ensure a certain ethnic composition.”15 Other 
nations soon followed suit. This same period of immigration quotas saw the development of 
other barriers to immigration: the institution of a passport system, stricter border control, and 
                                                           
14 Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter‐War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 21. 
15 Esther Rosenfeld, “Fatal Lessons: United States Immigration Law During the Holocaust,” UC Davis J. Int'l L. & 
Pol'y, 1995. p. 2. And Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter‐War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 22. 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alien registration.  This restriction of immigration further complicated the refugee problem by 
adding obstacles to international mobility.16 
  In the years preceding the Second World War, the refugee exodus in Europe became a 
crisis. After Hitler came to power in 1933 and subsequently embarked on building the Third 
Reich, Germans began fleeing the area. Initially the majority of those fleeing were political 
opponents to Hitler; later the refugees were predominantly Jewish. At the same time as Hitler 
was building his Reich in Germany, Francisco Franco was rising to power in Spain. Shortly before 
the war, hundreds of thousands of Spaniards joined the refugee exodus as they fled Franco’s 
regime.17 Few nations were willing to take in more than a few hundred of the thousands of 
European refugees.    
The reluctance to accept refugees, in particular those of Jewish descent, was aggravated 
by economic hardship and the Nazi laws impoverishing emigrants. The worldwide economic 
depression lasted far into the 1930s, and consequently most nations were reluctant to expand 
their populations.18 Nazi policy further complicated emigration issues. Nazi laws stripped Jews 
of property and bank accounts before they were allowed to emigrate. Hitler asked the world to 
take in impoverished refugees who would not have been welcome under the most ideal 
circumstances. Nations operated under strict immigration quota systems that set limits on the 
                                                           
16 Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter‐War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 21 
and 22. 
17 Michael Robert Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First World War through the Cold War, 
 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), 123. 
18 Richard Rubenstein and John Roth, Approaches to Auschwitz: The Holocaust and Its Legacy, ( Atlanta:  
John Knox Press, 2003), 122. 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number of refugees allowed from each country. In the end, only one in twelve European Jews 
was able to find refuge abroad.19  
In 1938, after the Anschluss20 and the subsequent increase in pressure to take in 
refugees, U.S. President Roosevelt called for an international conference to discuss the refugee 
crisis. On July 6th 1938, delegates from thirty‐two nations convened in Evian‐les‐Bains, France. 
The focus of the conference was on refugees in Europe, particularly Jewish refugees from 
Germany and Austria.21 The Conference resulted in a recognition of the growing crisis in 
Europe, but a firm unwillingness to offer help.  The chairman of the Evian Conference, former 
U.S. Steel Corporation CEO and personal friend of Roosevelt, Myron C. Taylor, stressed the 
importance of national sovereignty. Other delegates followed suit and, and, while expressing 
“support for the humanitarian principle” behind refugee aid, stated concern for their own 
national welfare.22  All in all, the delegates concluded that nations were unable to aid refugees 
and stressed the importance of individual migration through private organizations. The Evian 
Conference resulted in the creation of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, but 
offered little help to refugees themselves.23  
The attitude towards refugees at the Evian Conference and otherwise during this period, 
was fraught with racial undertones, as a substantial percentage of immigrants during the inter‐
war period were Jewish.  When the leaders of Nazi Germany pursued a policy of mass expulsion 
                                                           
19 Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, (New York: Braun Center for Holocaust Studies, 1994), 11‐12. 
20 Anchluss literally means “union” or “connection.” Anchluss was the name given to Hitler’s annexation of Austria 
in 1938. 
21 Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter‐War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
211. 
22 Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter‐War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 209 
and 212.  
23 Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter‐War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 
214. 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for the Jews, the nations of the world closed their doors. Of the 10 million Jews in occupied 
Europe, only 800,000 found refuge elsewhere. That is fewer than one in seven of the total 
number of Jews murdered.24 It was at the Evian Conference of 1938 that the Australian 
delegate summed up the attitude of the world toward the Jews: “It will no doubt be 
appreciated that as we [Australians] have no racial problem, we are not desirous of importing 
one.”25 No nation wanted the burden of thousands of refugees, particularly Jewish ones, and so 
they remained trapped in places where they were easily captured and later murdered.  
After the Second World War, as the scale of atrocity became known, international policy 
toward refugees came under a process of review. The tragedies of the war brought on a 
renewed sense of duty to the international community. Tragic events such as the Nazi 
Holocaust and the Japanese Rape of Nanking, put pressure on the world to take responsibility 
for human rights violations. These tragedies, and particularly the testimonies in the aftermath 
of war, made the international community feel remorse for not having taken action sooner. 
This sense of responsibility was evident in the shaping of post‐war policy.   
  The preeminent document of the United Nations regarding individual rights is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  A universal declaration of human rights, or something 
with a similar effect, had been called for since the middle of the Second World War but was not 
completed until late 1948. By 1943, the demand for “some sort of human rights plank” within 
the prospective peace treaties was fervent; private organizations even began taking the 
initiative to draft their own versions of an international bill of rights.” While the Charter of the 
United Nations did not include a bill of rights, it did mandate the establishment of a 
                                                           
24 Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, (New York: Braun Center for Holocaust Studies, 1994), 13. 
25 Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust, (New York: Braun Center for Holocaust Studies, 1994), 12. 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Commission on Human Rights, with the assumption that this commission would then draft an 
international bill of rights.26 With an increasingly intense demand for an expression of human 
rights, the Human Rights Commission began drafting The Declaration in 1947. The drafting 
process lasted nearly two years, from January 1947 to December 1948, in seven stages that 
included different committee meetings and debates throughout which the articulation of the 
declaration was refined.27   
The drafting of the Declaration, like the founding of the UN and the drafting of related 
legislation, was heavily influenced by the recent events of the Second World War.  In his history 
of the drafting of the UDHR, Johannes Morsink writes about World War II as a catalyst for 
human rights reform: “the drafters made it abundantly clear that the Declaration . . . had been 
born out of the experience of the war that had just ended.”28  In the final debate, in which the 
General Assembly put the Declaration to a vote, the influence of the war was firmly stated. 
Throughout the two year drafting process as well, the role of the Second World War as a 
catalyst was often noted. Specifically relating to the right of refugees, a number of delegates 
cited the war as a reason to guarantee these rights. The delegate from Belgium mentioned that 
“[article 13] was of vital importance: the principles of freedom of movement and freedom of 
residence had to be stressed at the moment when the war and the resulting upheavals had 
demonstrated to what point that principles could be trodden underfoot.”29 The atrocities that 
                                                           
26 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 1‐3. 
27 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 4. 
28 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 36. 
29 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 120th Meeting, Meeting Record. 2 Nov. 1948 
(A/C.3/SR120), 322. 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the international community witnessed during the Second World War made the necessity of 
these rights blatantly obvious. It was for these reasons that the members included a clause 
referring to the war in the preamble to the Declaration, where it states that the Declaration 
was drafted because “disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts 
which have outraged the conscience of mankind.”30  This clause refers back to the recent 
atrocities and the way in which they inspired a reform of human rights policy.  It is almost 
universally agreed among scholars that the modern human rights movement came out of the 
Second World War and the legacy of the tragedies that had occurred.31 David Weissbrodt and 
Connie De La Vega agree that “the war demonstrated that unfettered national sovereignty 
could not continue to exist without untold hardships and, ultimately, the danger of total 
destruction of human society. It was out of the trauma of WWII . . . that the modern human 
rights movement was born.”32 The Second World War provided impetus for the creation of 
universal human rights policy, but these well‐intended aspirations eventually fell to the 
interests of the state.  
  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights marked an important recognition of both 
individual and universal rights. The UDHR was the key document that fomented the 
development of human rights law. Prior to the postwar period, “the way a State treated its 
                                                           
30 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session, Plenary. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 10 Dec. 1948 (A/res/217A).   
31 However, Mark Mazower, in his book examining the United Nations, notes two scholars who do not see the 
1940s as the beginning of the human rights movement; Samuel Moyn in particular does not believe we can date 
the origin of the modern human rights movement before the 1970s. 31 As we examine the drafting process of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is clear that World War Two acted as a catalyst for the beginning of 
modern human rights policy. 
32 David Weissbrodt and Connie De La Vega, International Human Rights Law: An Introduction, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 21. 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citizens was regarded as an internal matter over which it had sovereign control.”33 After the 
war, the perspective on the rights of individuals as citizens changed drastically. The way a state 
treated its citizens was no longer considered an internal matter, but rather an international one 
(though this distinction was not necessarily true in practice, the war did change the 
international ideology). The Declaration acknowledges the universal right to life, freedom of 
speech, belief, movement, and freedom from fear, persecution and discrimination. Articles 13, 
14, and 15 specifically relate to the rights of refugees. These articles acknowledge the right to 
freedom of movement and residence, the right to seek and enjoy asylum, and the right to 
nationality.34 
  The UDHR is of particular importance because it was the first international document 
that acknowledged the universality of particular rights –rights that were not dependent on 
belonging to a certain state. Following the adoption of the UDHR almost all “multilateral 
instruments” were based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.35 For example, 
legislation of particular importance to refugees, such as the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, has used the UDHR as a kind of legal foundation. The UDHR quite obviously 
played a pivotal role in the development of a new human rights ideology. The extent to which 
its role remains purely ideological, however, is equally crucial.  
 
 
                                                           
33 Erika Feller and Volker Türk, Refugee Protection in International Law: UNCHR’s Global Consultations on 
International Protection, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 37. 
34Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 332. 
35 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 74 and 78. 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The Contradiction Inherent 
Many articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came up against the newly 
invigorated demand for individual rights and a long standing deference for national sovereignty. 
None of the articles faced opposition like the articles concerning freedom of movement, 
asylum, and nationality.36 Articles 13, 14, and 15 were particularly troubling for the drafting 
committees as they involved not just one state, but the cooperation of many states to allow 
mobility from one place to another. (See Appendix for the full text of these articles) 
The language of these articles sparked debate from the very outset of the drafting 
process. The drafting committee asked John Humphrey, Director of the Secretariat’s Division on 
Human Rights, to draft a preliminary version of a declaration.37 Humphrey’s “base” draft was 
then reviewed by the larger drafting committee, the Commission on Human Rights, the 
Economic and Social Council, and the General Assembly. Throughout these different sessions, 
the language was changed numerous times, often with nation states asking for more ambiguity 
and less responsibility while NGOs demanded stronger protections for individuals.38 It was the 
meetings of the Third Committee that finalized the refugee articles.   
Sessions 120 through 124 of the Third Committee of the Third Session of the General 
Assembly concerned the articles about refugees and asylum, which became articles thirteen 
through fifteen of the Declaration. While Articles 13 and 15 demonstrate the conflict between 
states rights and those of individuals, the provisions of Article 14 brought on a particularly 
                                                           
36 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999, 72. 
37 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999),  5. 
38 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 76 and 77. 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fervent discussion. Article 13 concerns freedom of movement and residence, article 14 the right 
to asylum, and article 15 the right to nationality.  
Article 13 particularly was not seen as much of a threat to national power. The 
discussion of this article was largely focused on the amendment put forth by the USSR, which 
attempted to restrict the scope of the article in deference to national sovereignty. Unlike in the 
discussion that followed for article 14, most of the states did not feel threatened by the 
provisions of article 13 –largely because Article 13 “presupposed that the individual in question 
had already obtained permission to enter the country, the right of entry being governed by the 
legislation of the country concerned.”39 Consequently, the majority of the delegates opposed 
the USSR amendment.  
The USSR amendment sought to add the words “in accordance with the laws of that 
State” to the end of paragraph one, stating that “Everyone has the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each State.” And also to include the clause "in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in the laws of that country,” after the words 
"Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own.”40 The general consensus about 
the USSR amendment was that it would unduly restrict the provisions of the article.  While a 
“state was entitled to decide how the principle was to be applied; . . . to include such 
interpretation in a declaration of human rights would imply the renunciation of the inherent 
rights of mankind.”41 This opinion was voiced by the delegate from Chile, and confirmed by the 
                                                           
39 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 120th Meeting, Meeting Record. 2 Nov. 1948 
(A/C.3/SR120), 319. 
40 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 3rd Session. Report of the Third Session of the Commission on Human Rights.  
28 June 1948 (E/800), 11 and 41. 
41 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 120th Meeting, Meeting Record. 2 Nov. 1948 
(A/C.3/SR120), remark by the Chilean delegate, 316. 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other delegates. It was felt that “a document drawn up in that sense would be a declaration of 
the absolute rights of the State and not a declaration of human rights.”42 Obviously the tension 
between national sovereignty and individual rights was apparent to the drafting delegations, 
However, they were able to be idealistic about sacrificing national sovereignty only as long as 
this sacrifice remained theoretical. As soon as the discussion turned to asylum, their idealism 
quickly dissipated.  
While a number of states found article 13 troubling,43 the majority were comfortable 
with it, and argued against putting more restrictions on it. During this debate, most nations 
actually expressed divergent concerns from the ones they would express only a day later, 
during the debate on article 14 concerning asylum, in which they expressed concerns about too 
much infringement upon national sovereignty. In the article 13 debate, delegates instead 
voiced cautions about government restrictions. The Haitian delegate felt, “government 
restrictions ran counter to the aspirations of the universal conscience; they might be tolerated 
as a temporary necessity, but there could be no question of including them in the 
declaration.”44 The Philippines delegation agreed that “the amendments proposed by the USSR 
delegation, if adopted, would nullify the meaning of article [13], because instead of establishing 
common standards to govern the movements of people in general, the Committee would be 
sanctioning the deplorable state of affairs which existed in the world.”45 This same point came 
up during the discussion of Article 15 –on the right to nationality –and was again pointed at a 
                                                           
42 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 120th Meeting, Meeting Record. 2 Nov. 1948 
(A/C.3/SR120), 316. 
43 Largely the Eastern Bloc states (USSR, Poland, UkrainianSSR, and Belarus).  
44 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 120th Meeting, Meeting Record. 2 Nov. 1948 
(A/C.3/SR120), 318. 
45 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 120th Meeting, Meeting Record. 2 Nov. 1948 
(A/C.3/SR120), 318. 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USSR amendment. The USSR delegate, Alexei Pavlov, “wished to stress the fact that the 
question of nationality –by which was meant a specific relationship between the State and the 
individual—fell entirely within the internal competence of each State. To grant nationality or to 
take away was a prerogative of sovereign States with which no third party should interfere.”46 
The response to this position was to reiterate a desire not to sanction “the deplorable state of 
[world] affairs.” The delegates responded to Pavlov with remarks about the intended nature of 
the declaration being to set an international standard and to be a bastion of principle for the 
nations of the world. The delegates felt comfortable being idealistic when they were secure in 
their sovereignty. The Chilean delegate responded to the USSR, remarking: 
 [the] purpose was not to impose laws on any sovereign State, but to enable the 
people of a State to judge for themselves whether the laws under which they lived 
were in conformity with the principles of the declaration. If the Hitler regime were 
still in existence, the result of adopting the USSR amendment would be to justify 
the acts of that regime rather than to protect individuals against them.47   
 
Eleanor Roosevelt agreed with the Chilean delegate about the need for sovereign states to give 
up a little power in order to conform more wholly with the Declaration: “To state that freedom 
of movement should be granted only in accordance with the laws of each country would be 
equivalent to limiting the fundamental rights of the individual and increasing the powers of the 
State.” Here Roosevelt expressed a desire to place individual well‐being above state power. 
However, when the debate turned to the right of immigration or asylum, nations were quick to 
                                                           
46 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 123rd Meeting, Meeting Record. 5 Nov. 1948 
(A/C.3/SR123), 355. 
47 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 123rd Meeting, Meeting Record. 5 Nov. 1948 
(A/C.3/SR123), 357. 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restrict the scope of the article, to willingly “increasing the powers of the State” and “limiting 
the fundamental rights of the individual.”48 
  When the issue of immigration came up briefly in the discussion of Article 13, and later 
within the discussion of Article 14, many delegates quickly reversed their opinions on sacrificing 
state sovereignty. Roosevelt sympathized with the view expressed by the Haitian delegate 
“especially when he explained that every man should have the right to settle in the country of 
his choice” but she felt that because “economic considerations had forced certain countries to 
take legal measures restricting immigration . . . A declaration of human rights should not 
contain principles the application of which was rendered impossible by existing 
circumstances.”49 This attitude toward sovereignty and immigration and asylum is fully evident 
within the article 14 discussion.  
  Article 14, ensuring the right of asylum, was the most contested article in the 
Declaration. John Humphrey, author of the original draft, wrote in his memoir, “No article in 
the Declaration has been more criticized than Article 14, which says that everyone has the right 
‘to seek and enjoy’ asylum from persecution.  This gives no right to asylum but only a right to 
enjoy it once it has been granted. It was probably too much to expect that governments would 
give up their discretionary power under international law to refuse to allow foreigners to enter 
their territories.”50 Humphrey himself recognized the reluctance of nation states to relinquish 
power in his original draft in which he “sidetracked the issue saying merely that ‘every state 
                                                           
48 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 120th Meeting, Meeting Record. 2 Nov. 1948 
(A/C.3/SR120), 319. 
49 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 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50 John P. Humphrey, 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(New York: Transnational 
Publishers, 1984), 70. 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shall have the right to grant asylum to political refugees,’ a right which was already recognized 
by international law” and which did little to actually further the status of refugees.51 His draft 
was amended to include stronger guarantees for refugees largely due to the influence and 
lobbying of non‐governmental organizations, but the final editing of the article would strip out 
its strongest language in favor for guarantees more amendable to nation states.   
 In November 1948, during the final debate on the declaration, amendments to this 
article had been proposed by eight countries: Bolivia, Cuba, Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Kingdom, Uruguay, and the USSR –all seeking to amend the article stating that 
“Everyone has the right to seek and be granted, in other countries, asylum from persecution.”52  
The discussion included who would be responsible for ensuring asylum and whether embassies 
would count as ports of asylum, but most of the discussion concerned the extent to which the 
article guaranteed refuge. Many of the delegates took issue with the fact that the article was 
guaranteeing the right to be granted asylum. They argued that this interfered with the 
sovereignty of the nation, and that they ought to retain the choice of when and to whom to 
offer refuge.  
  The debate on granting asylum began with Margery Corbet of the United Kingdom and 
her reservations about the article. The United Kingdom delegation stated that it was ready to 
“guarantee that any persecuted person asking for refuge would be treated with sympathy,” but 
that “no State could accept the responsibility imposed by [article 14].”53 The United Kingdom 
                                                           
51 John P. Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure, (New York: Transnational 
Publishers, 1984), 70. 
52 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 3rd Session. Report of the Third Session of the Commission on Human Rights.  
28 June 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(E/800). 
53 U.N. General Assembly, 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Nov. 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felt that adopting article 14 would be impossible “as no foreigner could claim the right of entry 
into any State unless that right were granted by treaty.” Corbet explains that her amendment 
includes the phrase “to enjoy asylum” as opposed to “to be granted,” and that this is a better 
representation of the right the assembly was trying to secure. The United Kingdom supported 
the Saudi Arabian amendment (which proposed to delete the words “and be granted” from the 
article), but thought it should be phrased as: “Everyone had the right to seek, and to enjoy, in 
other countries, asylum from persecution.” This structuring of the article was amenable 
because it limited “the obligation of the State,” but still provided some recourse for persecuted 
people. 54 
Saudi Arabia agreed with the United Kingdom in that assuring the right “to be granted” 
asylum “would be a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the State concerned.”55 Because 
article 14 did not include provisions for consulting the States about offering refuge, or delineate 
who would be responsible for directing persons to particular countries for asylum, “the article 
promised more than it should.”56 The majority of the states supported this position. The 
Australian delegation voiced support, saying “each State must be free to decide the form in 
which that right [of asylum], having been proclaimed in the declaration, should be applied.”57 
The states’ obvious concern for their own power eclipsed the more humanitarian concern of 
securing protections for refugees. 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These views expressing concern for national sovereignty were countered by the 
delegates from Lebanon, Pakistan and Poland. Mr. Azkoul of Pakistan thought that the 
“conception of the right of the individual had been replaced to a certain extent by that of the 
obligation of the State. The statement of a right should not, however, depend on the possibility 
of States to comply with that right.”58 This is exactly the problem the Assembly was wrestling 
with in this discussion of refugee rights: the rights of a state versus the rights of the individual. 
Azkoul was right in seeing that the obligations of the state were taking precedence over the 
rights of the individual. Though they began with very humanitarian and idealistic intentions, the 
delegates soon got bogged down in state politics and deference for national sovereignty. 
Poland thought that the UK and Saudi Arabian amendment would weaken the article. 
Uncharacteristically for Pavlov of the USSR, who had thus far been a fervent advocate of state 
sovereignty, he pushed for the right not only to seek, but also to receive, asylum: “The United 
Kingdom amendment affirmed the right to seek asylum, but that was of little value unless there 
were provisions for implementing it.”59  Ultimately the words “to be granted” asylum were 
deleted in favor of the idea of “enjoying” asylum, which put less pressure on the states to 
ensure asylum.  
 
Contradiction in Practice 
In the introduction to his book on the United Nations and Palestinian refugees, Edward 
Buehrig writes that political refugees “are the tragic product of an incompatible 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juxtaposition.”60 Here he is referring to conflicts like class, religion and ideology, but refugees 
are just as easily a product of the incompatible juxtaposition between national sovereignty and 
individual rights. Refugees are often unsafe or unhealthy in one country, but unwanted by 
another. At the time of the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, crises made 
both the necessity and the contradiction of the declaration evident. The Arab‐Israeli War of 
1948 triggered a massive refugee exodus that left thousands of refugees caught in a struggle 
between national sovereignty and individual welfare. The use of these refugees in the political 
bargaining between the Arab states and Israel exemplifies the disregard of individual rights in 
favor of state concerns.   
The longstanding relationship between the UN and Palestine makes the example of the 
UDHR and the Arab‐Israeli War especially meaningful. The UN has been involved in the 
Palestine conflict longer “than in any other regional dispute.” It was involved from the outset as 
crafter of the two‐state partition plan, as head of the refugee relief effort, and as peacekeeper 
and mediator.61 The UN played a key role in the escalation of the problem and more than sixty 
years later continues to police it. Furthermore, the UNs involvement in Palestine developed 
concurrent to its drafting of a universal human rights platform, and this declaration provided a 
backdrop for UN actions in Palestine. 
The origins of the Arab Jewish conflict in Palestine are complex and date back 
considerably. However, the particulars of the 1948 war begin with The British Mandate in 
Palestine. After the First World War, some territories of the Ottoman Empire, of which 
                                                           
60Edward 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Palestine was one, were divided into mandates. The League of Nations mandate transferred 
control from the Ottoman Empire to various allied countries. The United Kingdom gained 
control of the area in 1917, and was officially given a mandate to administer a newly defined 
Palestine in 1923.62  
Throughout the period of the mandate, there was constant conflict among Jews, Arabs, 
and the British. Palestinian Arabs demanded an Arab Palestine while Zionist Jews refused to 
curb immigration or tame demands for a Jewish state in Palestine. During the First World War, 
and the entirety of the mandate period, the British made promises to both groups, though they 
were more consistently supportive of a Jewish state. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 stated 
outright British support for a Jewish state in Palestine, and this declaration was included as a 
part of the official mandate over the area. After an Arab rebellion in 1936, the British withdrew 
some of their promises to the Jews, and made an attempt to restrict Jewish immigration, but 
their previous support for a Jewish state in Palestine had already both alienated and injured the 
Arabs there.63 
In February 1947, Britain decided to relinquish control of Palestine due to an inability to 
find an acceptable solution to the conflict and an increasing difficulty in maintaining control 
over the area.64 The Mandate would not officially end until May 1948, but the “problem” of 
Palestine was officially handed over to the UN in February.65  In May the United Nations Special 
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed to create a solution for the conflict in Palestine. 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In August, UNSCOP presented a partition plan to the General Assembly that suggested dividing 
Palestine into two separate states with an economic union. The plan was hotly debated in the 
Assembly; deliberations lasted until November of 1947 and the plan still barely managed to get 
the required two‐thirds majority for adoption. Ultimately, the plan was accepted by the Jewish 
community but rejected by the Palestinians. 66   
On September 1, 1947, the day after the partition plan was brought before the General 
Assembly, fighting broke out in Palestine. The widespread violence soon became a full‐out civil 
war.67  Palestinian Arabs rioted and attacked Jewish owned businesses. In December, the Arab 
Higher Committee organized a strike to protest the adoption of the UN partition plan.68 The 
Palestinian Arabs were outraged by the partition plan that gave “37 percent of the population 
55 percent of the land (of which they owned only 7 percent)” and which forced them from the 
most fertile land.69 The Jews responded to Arab attacks with attacks of their own. The civil war 
was “characterized by guerrilla warfare accompanied by acts of terrorism.”70 This civil‐war 
between Palestinian Arabs and Jews in the region lasted until May 1948, when the British 
Mandate in Palestine was terminated and the Arab‐Israeli war began.  
The Arab‐Israeli War officially began after the Jewish nation declared statehood on the 
14th of May, anticipating the conclusion of the British Mandate. Five Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, 
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) responded by invading the newly created nation. The Arab States 
                                                           
66 Ilan Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 125. 
67 Ilan Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 127. 
68 Yoav Gelber, Palestine, 1948: War, Escape and the Emergence of the Palestinian Refugee Problem (Sussex: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 16. 
69 Benny Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab‐Israeli War, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 65. 
70 Benny Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab‐Israeli War, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 77. 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were motivated by a strong desire not to have a Jewish state established among their own 
nations. They were further motivated to invade by the steady refugee flow from Palestine as 
well as the increasing certainty of Palestinian Arab failure in the conflict.  Israel’s declaration of 
statehood and the invasion by the Arab states triggered further fighting between Jewish and 
Arab groups in the cities and on the roads.71  
The first wave of refugees came before the war even began. After the UN General 
Assembly resolution on the 29th of November 1947 sanctioned the division of British controlled 
Palestine into two states, Arab people began leaving the Jerusalem and Jaffa areas. The causes 
of the refugee exodus were then, and are still, fervently debated. Both sides blamed the other 
for the refugee crisis: “according to the Arab Higher Committee, some 550,000 Palestinian 
Arabs had been forced to leave their homes as a result of Jewish attacks” but according to 
Israel, “most of these [refugees] had left Palestine during recent months in the wake of the war 
launched against Israel by neighboring Arab States, partly in obedience to direct orders by local 
Arab military commanders, and partly as a result of the panic campaign spread among 
Palestinian Arabs by the leaders of the invading Arab States.”72 It is likely that the cause of the  
refugee exodus is a combination of many events. The invasion by the Arab states exacerbated 
the instability already present in the region; during the civil war that preceded the official Arab‐
Israeli War, there were sporadic attacks between Arab and Jewish groups, as well as a 
persecution campaign focused on the Arabs by the Haganah.73 In the months leading up to the 
official outbreak of war, Plan Dalet, a Zionist offensive against Arabs was enacted. This 
                                                           
71 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 13. 
72 The United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1947‐1948,  447. 
73 Haganah was a Jewish Paramilitary group that late became the Israeli Defense Forces.  Benny Morris, The Birth 
of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 67. 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campaign included forced migration, attacks, rapes, and a number of massacres of Arab 
villages.74 The outbreak of war only increased the refugee flow.  By July 1948 it was clear that a 
refugee crisis was at‐hand.75 By this time “400,000‐500,000 Arabs had been displaced by the 
fighting.”76 The refugee crisis was a concern to the international community, and particularly to 
the Arab states, but no one state felt that they could or should take responsibility. There was a 
general call for the UN to head up the refugee relief effort.  
The Palestinian refugees first came under discussion at the 117th and 118th meetings of 
the Third Session of the UN General Assembly –at the same session in which they were 
conducting an article by article analysis of the UDHR.  Following the recommendation of UN 
envoy Folke Bernadotte that the UN take charge of refugees, the committee initiated a 
discussion regarding how best to provide aid. The meeting minutes of the 117th meeting 
recognize that the case of the Palestinian refugees had relevance to the universal declaration at 
hand. The minutes state, “the Third Committee was no longer faced with an abstract idea of 
humanity as described in the declaration of human rights, but with a specific case.”77 The Arab‐
Israeli War presented the committee with an opportunity to move away from the abstract 
principles they were trying to uphold. They acknowledged that “those fine ideas and 
stimulating provisions had been violated in the most manifest fashion in the case of the 
                                                           
74 David Gilmour, Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians, 1917‐1980 ( London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980), 
68 and 69. 
75 Edward H. Buehrig, The UN and the Palestinian Refugees: A Study in Nonterritorial Administration, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1971),  26. 
76 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 39. 
77 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 117th  Meeting, Meeting Record. 29 Oct. 1948 
(A/C.3/SR117),  283. 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Palestine refugees. That crime was being committed under the very eyes of the judges.”78 The 
discussion centered around where best to procure funds from and how best to administer 
them. These sessions led to the development of a sub‐committee to further explore the issue.79  
The sub‐committee drafted a proposal for a relief program. After review by the General 
Assembly, the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR) was created on November 
19th 1948.80 The UNRPR was followed, in 1950, by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA). The UNRPR was funded by the UN’s Working Capital Fund and its member agencies. 
Their focus was on offering economic aid for the refugees. The UNWRA absorbed the works of 
the UNRPR and continues this work today.  
The original United Nations mediator to Palestine, Bernadotte, who had recommended 
the refugees become a UN charge, wrote to the Assembly that the “choice is between saving 
the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die.”81 The solution by the 
United Nations, to offer aid to the refugees but no permanent refuge, left hundreds of 
thousands of refugees in a limbo of sorts. Refugee camps still exist from the 1948 war, more 
than sixty years later.  Today the UNWRA continues to provide “assistance, protection and 
advocacy for some 4.7 million registered Palestine refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the 
                                                           
78 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 117th  Meeting, Meeting Record. 29 Oct. 1948 
(A/C.3/SR117),  283. 
79 U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 117th  Meeting, Meeting Record. 29 Oct. 1948 
(A/C.3/SR117),  279.  And U.N. General Assembly, 3rd Session. Third Committee. 118th  Meeting, Meeting Record. 
30 Oct. 1948 (A/C.3/SR118), 304. 
80 The United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1948‐1949,  202.  
81 Folke Bernadotte, United Nations, Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, 16 Sep. 1948, 
(A/648), 53. 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occupied Palestinian territory, pending a solution to their plight.”82 No one was willing to take 
responsibility for the refugees and today these people continue to suffer.  
Both Israel and the neighboring Arab states used the refugees “as a political pawn.”83  
Israel refused to let the refugees return, but later used them as a bargaining piece in attempts 
to gain a more favorable peace deal.84  Despite UN sanctions asking for the repatriation of 
refugees, the official Israeli policy, as voiced by Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, remained as 
follows:  “in  the  main  a  solution  must  be  sought, not  through  the  return  of  the  refugees  
to  Israel,  but  through their  resettlement  in  other states.”85  The Arab states in turn refused 
to absorb the refugees, hoping that Israel would eventually take them back and thus effectively 
“destabilize” the Jewish state.  Stuck in the middle of a political battle between states, 
individual rights once again were disregarded.  
Israel’s desire for a Jewish state left no room for the return of thousands of Arab 
refugees. In a memorandum to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, the 
government of Israel wrote in July 1949: 
The clock cannot be put  back.  Since  this  first  arose, the  Jewish population  
has  increased  by  50%.  The  question  of  housing  the newcomers  was  partly  
solved  by  placing  them  into  habitable  houses in  abandoned  Arab  towns  
and  villages.  Immigration continues at an average rate  of  800  per  day.  
These  figures  alone  give  clear indication  that  the  individual  return  of  Arab  
refugees  to  their former  places  of  residence  is  an  impossible  thing.  Not  
only  can the  whole  Arab  economic  system  not  be  simply  restored  because  
                                                           
82 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “About UNRWA,” 
http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=47 
83 Quote from Mark Etheridge, Palestine Conciliation Commission, in The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 
Revisited, Benny Morris, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 39. 
84 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 551. 
85 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Memorandum to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 8 
Aug. 1949 (A/AC.25/IS.33). 
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its basis  has  practically  disappeared;  but  also  the  physical  return of  the  
Arab  middle‐classes  such  as  shopkeepers, tradesmen,  free professions,  has  
become  a  physical  and  geographical  impossibility. Their  houses  have  gone,  
their  jobs  have  gone.86   
 
The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested resettlement in Arab countries as a solution 
more favorable than repatriation. The Arab countries were both unwilling and unable to 
commit to incorporation of the hundreds of thousands of refugees. Stubbornness on both sides 
coupled with the UN’s inability to enforce its sanctions led to a stalemate on the issue. Concern 
for human rights soon fell to the wayside, as national concern overshadowed the desire to 
secure individual welfare.  As the member states of the UN had not adopted a guarantee of the 
right to secure asylum, the UN put pressure on Israel in an effort to enforce the right of return, 
which had been established by the UDHR. The final language of articles 13 and 14 in the 
Declaration had a pivotal effect on how the countries involved in the Arab‐Israeli War were 
framed. The UN recommended both repatriation and resettlement for the refugees, but, 
because of the influence of the UDHR, more strongly pushed Israel on the issue of repatriation.  
The Arab‐Israeli War clearly demonstrates the tragedy of not establishing definitive 
language to guarantee refugees asylum, but it also exhibits a clear dismissal of what rights had 
been guaranteed –specifically the right of return. The final debate over article 13 focused much 
attention on the right of return. The working draft of the Declaration guaranteed an individual’s 
right to “to leave any country” and the final debate made a point to guarantee that an 
individual had the right to “leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” 
This right has been ignored for Palestinian refugees. Thousands of Palestinians fled their homes 
                                                           
86 Government of Israel, Memorandum to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine on Principles 
Guiding the Resettlement of Arab Refugees, 28 July 1949, (A/AC.25/Com.Tech/8). 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and were never allowed to return. The newly declared State of Israel was threatened by the 
idea of thousands of Arabs returning to the area, and refused to let them back. In August 1948 
they began implementing an official anti‐repatriation policy. This included destroying or 
occupying Palestinian homes and villages.87   
On December 11th 1948 the United Nations passed Resolution 194 on Palestine. The 
resolution lays out a number of guidelines for the situation in Palestine, perhaps most notably, 
the resolution calls for a return of the refugees to their homes: “[The General Assembly] 
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date.”88 This direct urging, 
as well as its backing principle, Article 13 in the UDHR, officially adopted one day prior on 
December 10th, 1948, was disregarded by the State of Israel. Israel adamantly refused to 
repatriate the refugees, and the UN was in no position to force them to do so. Resolution 194 
was the first of many UN resolutions urging Israel to acknowledge the refugee's right to return. 
In following years, the UN would continue to sanction Israel, petitioning them to repatriate the 
Palestinian refugees. The UN annually renews Resolution 194, and continues to ask Israel to 
"affirm the inalienable rights of all inhabitants who had left their homes as a result of the 
outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East to return home, resume their normal life, recover their 
property and homes, and rejoin their families according to the provision of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights."89 The way in which the articles in the UDHR were affected by the 
conflict between sovereignty and individual rights shaped the way the 1948 Arab‐Israeli War 
                                                           
87 Ilan Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 145. 
88 U.N. General Assembly, Resolution 194, 11. Dec 1948 (A/RES/194(III)).  
89 U.N. General Assembly, Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, 11 March 
1976 (A/AC.183/L.3).  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was dealt with. The UN has also urged Arab states to consider officially resettling Palestinian 
refugees, but has done so without the backing of the UDHR, and with less force than with which 
it has approached Israel.  
Despite UN sanctions, the urgency of the Palestinian refugee problem soon faded from 
international attention. Though the United Nations initially approached the Arab‐Israeli conflict 
with a fervent desire to broker peace and implement the rights in the UDHR, “in the end, all the 
parties, including Israel, accommodated themselves to the stalemate of an armistice policed by 
the UN peacekeepers.”90 This change in attitude applied to the refugee situation as well. The 
UN quickly went from trying to resolve the problem to simply sustaining the refugees as they 
were. This attitude was especially apparent throughout early 1949, when the UN began 
discussing Israel’s application for UN membership. Just months after the adoption of the UDHR 
and the issuing of Resolution 194, UN member states showed little compulsion to abide by the 
principles to which they had agreed. The Arab states made strong objections to Israel’s 
admission, specifically due to Israel’s non compliance with the refugee situation. Fawzi Bey of 
Egypt did not support Israel’s application and mentioned the rights given to the refugees by the 
UDHR: “Were those refugees not human beings? Did not a Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights exist?” The Saudi Arabia delegation agreed with Bey: “It would be unwise to admit 
[Israel] . . . They had carried out acts of terrorism at the very moment when certain democratic 
States were promoting the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and were 
about to sign the Convention on Genocide. . . .  Despite those facts, some Members still 
considered the applicant a peace‐loving State.” As Bey states, despite Israel’s non‐compliance 
                                                           
90 Nathan Pelcovits, The Long Armistice: UN Peacekeeping and the Arab‐Israeli Conflict, 1948‐1960 (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1993), 7. 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with the UDHR and subsequent UN sanctions, the majority of the member states argued to 
admit Israel into the UN. Warren Austin of the US summed up the majority opinion by agreeing 
that Israel needed to abide by the UN resolution, but he nonetheless thought that “the long 
discussion of Israel's application was evidence of the general deep‐rooted desire for a just 
solution of questions relating to Palestine, and especially those of Jerusalem and the Arab 
refugees,” and in light of that “the United States delegation, together with the large majority of 
members of the Security Council and of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, considered that Israel 
fulfilled the requirements of [membership].”91 The Arab States, with their concerns regarding 
Israel and the refugee crisis, were hugely outnumbered. Israel was admitted as a member to 
the UN on May 11th 1949.92 
In a somewhat hollow gesture towards a conclusion of the conflict, the UN continues to 
request Israel’s repatriation of the refugees, and Israel continues to ignore this request.93 The 
State of Israel actively ignores individual rights in favor of its own national agenda. At the same 
time, Arab states refuse refugees citizenship, denying them both the right to true asylum and 
the right to nationality. The refugee tragedy stemming from the 1948 Arab‐Israeli War 
exemplifies the tenuous relationship between the rights and interests of nation states and 
those of individuals. Both in theory and in practice, nation states infringe upon individual rights 
for their own benefit. Regardless of the progress made in international policy, or the 
promulgation of rights’ declarations and conventions, the rights of the individual are not 
secure.   
                                                           
91 U.N. General Assembly, 207th Plenary Meeting, Meeting Record 11 May 1949 (A/PV.207). 
92 U.N. General Assembly, 207th Plenary Meeting, Meeting Record 11 May 1949 (A/PV.207). 
93 David Gilmour, Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians, 1917‐1980 ( London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980), 
75. 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Conclusion 
Both the drafting of the UDHR and the Arab‐Israeli war exhibit the repercussions of the 
tension between state power and individual rights. Despite the ambitious and humanitarian 
intentions following WWII, numerous factors mitigated the more humanitarian goals of the 
international community. In his larger text on the UDHR, Johannes Morsink mentions that “the 
lesson learned from the Holocaust was lost in the disagreements about what to do about the 
half million refugees created by the 1948 Arab‐Israeli war.”94 Morsink briefly suggests that the 
concerns of the Arab states were the cause behind the change in language in the UDHR. 
However, he glosses over the fact that the most vocal advocates for changing the provisions of 
the asylum article were western nations, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. 
These nations did not experience the same potential affect of the unfolding Arab‐Israeli refugee 
crisis, yet remained adamant about not guaranteeing refugee asylum.  
Still, the UN discussions of the refugees from the Arab‐Israeli war do illustrate the way 
the conflict between state interests and individual interests within the UDHR played out. Yet, 
the two events are not tied as intimately as Morsink implies. Because of the simultaneity, it is 
tempting to see a direct correlation between the drafting of the UDHR and the events of the 
Arab‐Israeli War.  That is, either the refugee crisis shaped the debates and final articulation of 
rights, or the UN’s growing concern for human rights led the institution to address the 
Palestinian refugee crisis in ways in line with the UDHR.  While the Arab‐Israeli War was a 
legitimate crisis of human rights with which the UN and its member states were confronted just 
                                                           
94 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 78. 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as they were attempting to articulate universal rights for individuals, the war actually illustrates 
the inherent contradiction of a community of nation states charged with the security of 
universal individual rights. States hold the power to ensure rights, but have rarely 
demonstrated the motivation to uphold them when worse comes to worst. Consequently, 
Article 14 of the UDHR was passed without firm language asserting the right of refugees “to be 
granted” asylum, instead they were left with the right simply “to seek and to enjoy” asylum.  
Other articles, like Article 13 regarding the right to asylum, which were passed with firmer 
language have simply been ignored. And 4.7 million Arab‐Israeli refugees continue to live a 
troubled and stateless existence.   
However, over the long‐term, the articles in the UDHR and the particular ways in which 
they articulated this tension between sovereignty and individual rights have shaped the way 
the 1948 Arab‐Israeli War has been approached. Because of the way national sovereignty 
reigned in the UDHR debates, the right to asylum was not assured, yet the right to return was. 
Because of this, the UN and a host of others have been able to use the UDHR as a tool to put 
pressure on Israel to allow the return of refugees to their land. At the same time, the UDHR 
does not serve to urge the Arab states to grant these same refugees asylum. This is evident 
within the UN discussions and ensuing measures, such as Resolution 194 of 1948. The issue of 
granting asylum (or not) and the right of return established an intellectual framework for how 
the states involved with the Palestinian refugees would be regarded. 
The UN’s entrenched involvement in the Arab‐Israeli War, as well as the timing of the 
conflict –just as the delegates were in the end stages of drafting the UDHR—make the War a 
particularly interesting example. The Arab‐Israeli War and the ensuing refugee crisis not only 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demonstrate the conflict between nations and individuals, but the way in which the UN and the 
international community approached the situation was shaped by the promulgation of the 
UDHR. Because of the principles within the Declaration, pressure remains on Israel to rectify 
the refugee crisis. Arab states continue to offer refuge to millions of Palestinians, but refuse full 
asylum or citizenship. The simultaneity of the conflict and the Declaration affected the way in 
which the crisis has been, and is, managed. 
The impasse demonstrated in the examples of both the UDHR drafting and the Arab‐
Israeli War are particularly relevant today, in a world where states increasingly restrict the 
provisions for refugees in favor of ensuring state security and national sovereignty. Erika Feller 
and Volker Türk write that: 
Security concerns since the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 
dominate the debate, including in the migration area, and have at times 
overshadowed the legitimate protection interests of individuals. A number of 
countries have, for instance, revisited their asylum systems from a security angle 
and have in the process tightened procedures and introduced substantial 
modifications.95  
 
State concerns, from Palestinian refugees to modern‐day terrorists, have often overshadowed 
the rights of individuals. Especially in the era of terrorism, when national security is heightened 
around the world and immigration is continuously being restricted, refugee rights and their 
history are important.  
In the case of the UDHR, refugee protections were marginalized in favor of state 
protection. Before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was complete, the Arab‐Israeli 
War played out the conflicts between national and individual rights that the drafters faced. 
                                                           
95 Erika Feller and Volker Türk, Refugee Protection in International Law: UNCHR’s Global Consultations on 
International Protection, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 5. 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What was a momentous Declaration has become little more than a theoretical nod to individual 
rights  —rights which do not actually play out on the international field. This deep‐rooted 
tension prevents individuals from truly having these rights guaranteed. 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APPENDIX – Articles 13, 14, and 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights   
 
 
Article 13 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each 
state. 
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. 
 
Article 14 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. 
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non‐
political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
 
Article 15 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his 
nationality. 
 
